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1 INTRODUCTION1
This issue of the Bulletin bears testimony to the recent
surge of interest in counterpart funds; and given the
size of the current wave of interest in the subject,2 it
might be thought that there is little left to add. There is
indeed a clear consensus on many of the important
macroeconomic issues. At the same time, macro-
economic concerns have dominated the discussion and
sectoral issues have been neglected. This article
attempts to fill the gap. It begins with a review of the
current conventional wisdom (Section 2), continues
with a discussion of neglected issues (Section 3) and
concludes with principles for an improved approach
(Section 4).
The main outcome of the discussion is to give a new
emphasis to the developmental function of counterpart
funds, placing recipient government strategy at the
centre of analysis and focusing in particular on the
activities or policies that additional aid either makes
possible or prevents being cut. This leads to a sharper
focus on the commodity-specific impact on import
demand resulting from government expenditure. In
addition, policy issues assume greater importance,
particularly (and not only for food aid) in the context of
potential disincentive and dependency effects.
2 THE STORY SO FAR
The question of counterpart funds has generated a
large literature on both food and financial aid: Owens
(1991) lists over 100 references on different aspects of
the problem. However, there is agreement on the basic
economics and management of counterpart funds. The
conventional wisdom is summarized in Figure 1.
The fundamental point captured by the first two points
of Figure 1 is that counterpart funds are not in
themselves an additional resource. In economic terms,
the resource transfer takes place when the commodities
of foreign exchange are sold into the domestic market of
the recipient country. At this point, there is indeed a
real resource transfer: the sale of the commodities or
foreign exchange will transfer resources from the
A considerably longer version of this article was published in June
1991 as IDS Discussion Paper No 289, under the title 'The
developmental uses of counterpart funds' (Maxwell with Owens
1991). Apart from a general shortening, the main omissions from the
present version are discussions of the monetisation of food aid
(covered by Schulthes in this Bulletin) and the problems of
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private sector to the public sector and reduce domestic
demand as well as the money supply. When
counterpart funds are later spent, there are no new real
resources, but the effect is reflationary: a transfer of
purchasing power back to the private sector and an
increase in the money supply.
On this view, counterpart funds are no more (but no
less) than an accounting device, which enables the
original donor to exert leverage over the way in which
fiscal and monetary adjustments are carried out. In
many circumstances, conditionality of this kind will not
be necessary: for example, if the donor is in general
agreement with the thrust of the country's development
strategy. In these cases, it may not be appropriate to
create a counterpart fund at all.
On the other hand, there may well be cases where
conditionality appears necessary, either because the
donor is unhappy with the recipient country's
development strategy or because the recipient
government finds it politically difficult to protect
specific kinds of expenditure. In these cases, it may be
desirable to establish a counterpart fund account,
although even here, problems of fungibility arise: a
donor may find itself funding projects from the
counterpart fund that the government would have
undertaken anyway, while the original resource
transfer is used to fund items (white elephants,
cathedrals in the desert, military expenditure) of which
the donor does not approve.
If a counterpart fund is to be established, experience
since the 1 950s shows that certain conditions have to be
met for it to be effective. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
statement of principles list these conditions, which
have to do with the size and regularity of aid transfers,
the valuation of commodities and the undesirability of
allowing counterpart funds to accumulate.
Finally, a number of practical considerations follow
from the general principles, summarized in Paragraph 5
of Figure 1: counterpart funds should be planned in
advance, credited and spent quickly, subject to the
normal procedures for appraisal and managed in as
conditionality (covered by Fell). The Discussion Paper also contains
more detailed proposals regarding the project cycle for counterpart
funds.
2 See especially Roemer 1989, Clement 1989, Bruton and Hill, 1991.
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simple a way as possible, preferably through a single
account or one common to several donors.
The conventional wisdom summarized in Figure 1
offers a sound approach to counterpart fund
accounting, albeit one which is rarely implemented in
practice. There are, however, three criticisms that can
be levied at the recent literature on which it is based.
First, there has been insufficient attention to the
analytical models of the early discussion of counterpart
funds, particularly those dealing with food aid. A major
difference is that the early models put development
plans much more firmly at the centre of discussion.
They began with proposed development projects and
then looked at the implications both for total aid
requirements and for the commodity composition of
such aid (FAO 1955, 1961; Beringer 1964; Dandekar
1965; Srivastava et al 1975). Partly as a result of this
difference, project and sectoral issues receive short
shrift in the current literature.
A second criticism of the current conventional wisdom
is that it deals in aggregate terms with developing
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economies in an average year. Apart from the lack of
commodity disaggregation, already noted, there is no
regional disaggregation in the analysis and very little
attempt to deal with the problems of countries where
agricultural production, budget deficits, prices and
incomes all vary markedly from year to year. In these
cases, control of the public expenditure programme
becomes much more difficult and counterpart fund
expenditures may have disproportionately positive or
negative results.
A third criticism is that the current literature does little
to address wider concerns, such as growing import and
fiscal dependence and potential disincentive effects.
Concern with these issues can lead to different
approaches, for example to the monetisation of food
aid.
In dealing with the criticisms and qualifications, it is
important to emphasise that there is no single model of
a recipient country, nor any single approach to
counterpart fund accounting (Bruton and Hill 1991).
Nevertheless, it remains the case that some of the major
Figure 1: Commodity aid and counterpart funds. The conventional wisdom
The local currency counterpart funds generated by commodity aid are not an additional resource over
above the value of the commodities themselves.
The generation of counterpart funds provides an opportunity for donor conditionality over the size and
composition of government expenditure, with due allowance for the fungibility of budgets. This may be
appropriate if there is disagreement about the budget or if government finds it hard to protect essential
expenditures.
The opportunity for conditionality will be lost if counterpart funds are allowed to accumulate; or if they
are eroded by inflation, implicit subsidies or over-valued exchange rates.
Conditionality is also more likely to be effective if counterpart funds are predictable, regular and
sizeable.
It follows that where counterpart funds are appropriate they should be:
planned in advance, preferably in the context of a multi-year agreement, linked to other aid and
with the possibility of 'substitution actions';
credited without delay to a government-controlled interest-bearing account at the full c.i.f. value,
before subsidies or deductions;
(e) disbursed quickly, following an agreed plan, on deficit reduction or on specific projects approved
within the public expenditure programme;
subject to the normal procedures for project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation;
managed in such a way as to minimise the administrative load on recipient countries, either in a
single account for each donor or in a common counterpart fund account, covering several donors.
Sources: Roemer 1989, Clement 1989, Bruton and Hill 1991, Goreux 1990, CEGOS-IDET 1989, Knop 1989, 1990,
Riley 1990, WFP 1983, 1987a,b, 1990.
recipients of counterpart funds, especially in SSA, are
precisely those where the problems of instability, fiscal
dependence and potential disincentives are most acute.
3 NEGLECTED ISSUES IN THE CURRENT
DEBATE
3.1 Sectoral and commodity disaggregation
The implications of putting projects first were
demonstrated in the early literature on food aid. In
1953, Nurkse had explored the use of under-employed
labour for capital formation in poor countries. Two
years later, Ezekiel produced a classic study for FAO
(FAO 1955), which examined the potential contribution
of food aid to labour intensive development strategies.
Here, the strategy came first and the food aid with its
counterpart funds came later.
Ezekiel defined two conditions for commodity aid to be
effective: a) food or other potential aid commodities
had to be the constraint on development in recipient
countries; and b) either the increase in consumption of
foods had to be as large as the addition to supply or
commodity aid had to be supplemented with other aid
resources. In practice, Ezekiel suggested that only
between a third and a half of the additional demand
resulting from a typical works project would be for
commodities of the surplus type found in food aid
programmes: the remaining increase in demand would
have to be met from other sources, notably financial aid
or non-food commodity aid.
These conclusions were generalised by an FAO Expert
Group in 1961, whose report 'Development through
Food', led to the creation of the World Food
Programme in l963. The key steps in the analysis were
to estimate total aid requirements in developing
countries and then to calculate what proportion of total
aid should be made up of food. The Group concluded
that about one fifth of total aid could consist of food,
with perhaps a third of this providing a subsistence
fund for workers employed on capital projects and the
remaining two thirds mopping up additional demand
during various rounds of expenditure following the
original investment.
This kind of analysis became more sophisticated in
later years as attention focused more closely on the
nature of multiplier effects and on the need for
complementary resources. The findings were
summarized by Maxwell in 1978 in a table reproduced
as Table 1. This shows alternative estimates of the
impact of an investment of 100 units on a) total
demand; b) the share of food in demand; and c) the
relationship between food demand and total investment.
A summary of this report is tobe found in Singer and Maxwell (1983). investigate production and consumption linkages in this context.
See Evans and Diab 1991 for the use of a social accounting matrix to
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In all cases, it is assumed that the demand for food is
entirely met from food aid, so that the total multiplier is
heavily damped: without food aid, the same studies
show that it would range from 5 to 8, rather than the
figure of 2-3 shown in the table (Maxwell ibid:9).
The main conclusions of the table are consistent with
the earlier analysis in showing that demand for food is
only a part of the total demand generated by a works
project, between 18 and 45 per cent, depending on the
assumptions made. Furthermore, food aid alone cannot
meet the total extra demand generated by projects:
complementary resources are needed to cover up to two
thirds of the total cost.
It is important to note that the assumptions on which
this kind of analysis is made are fairly restrictive.
Maxwell noted that the increase in demand could be
offset in at least four ways: a) by increasing taxation;
b) through supply response for particular commodities
whose supply is elastic; c) if stocks of food or other
commodities can be run down; and d) if the works
themselves contribute quickly to increased output.
On the other hand, the analysis is also incomplete in
important respects. One is its failure to deal with
regional effects. Another is that, reflecting its
Keynesian origins, the analysis is driven by con-
sumption linkages. A more sophisticated analysis
would recognise that production linkages are also
important and that these would have the effect of
increasing the multiplief.4
Despite the limitations of the Keynesian approach
reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs, it does contain
three important implications for the management of
counterpart funds.
j The importance of commodity disaggregation. The
macroeconomic analysis sometimes gives the
impression that if a project is to be financed by
counterpart funds, there is no difference in terms of
monetary aggregates between importing S 100 worth of
caviare and S 100 worth of wheat. Indeed, in strictly
aggregate terms it is true that supply increases by $100
when the commodity is imported and that demand
increases by SlOO (in the first round) when the
counterpart fund is spent. However, the multiplier
analysis shows that there will be different effects on the
demand for different commodities, which will in turn
have an impact on prices and on income distribution
between productive sectors and between producers and
consumers.
ii The importance of dealing with both direct and
indirect effects. The multiplier analysis shows that
Table 1: Alternative estimates of demand resulting from investment in public works
(with food aid)
Sources and notes:FAO (1955) p.57. Uses Indian data.
Dandekar (1965) pp.48-52. Variant (b) differs from (a) in that recipients of derived demand have a lower
MPG. Uses Indian data. Investment in wages only.
Beringer (1964) Table II-1 p.27 and II-2 p.26. Uses Pakistani data, includes some non-food commodities in
aid package.
Srivastava et al (1975) pp.22-36. Variants are for low (a), medium (b) and high (c) income countries.
even a project which consists almost entirely of food
expenditure in the first round will generate demand for
other products in the second and subsequent rounds.
This demand maybe inflationary (in which case it may
have income distribution effects) or it may be
translated into imports (in which case the Balance of
Payments will worsen). In either case, complementary
aid resources may be required. It is particularly
important to note that projects funded from
counterpart funds, even if their budgets consist entirely
of local costs, will generate additional demand for
foreign exchange in this way.
iii The need for ex-ante analysis of sector response to
increased demand. The literature reviewed suggests
that expenditure on projects need not be inflationary if
supply response is high or if the project itself generates
a rapid return. In these circumstances, providing aid
may lead to a disinflationary and disincentive effect.
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3.2 Inter-annual variability
An important aspect of the real world in which
counterpart funds operate has to do with inter-annual
variability. In many of the poorest countries, in
particular, agricultural production varies markedly
from year to year; in most such countries, agriculture is
the lead sector of the economy. A good, if extreme case,
is Sudan, where agricultural production in the l980s
was severely affected by drought. Between 1982/83
and 1986/87, agricultural GDP fell by 3.9 per cent
overall: however, the annual growth rate varied from
-23.6 per cent to +28.0 per cent. At the same time, the
growth rate of overall GDP varied from -12.8 per cent
to +11.8 per cent (Sudan 1988:1). Preliminary figures
for 1987/88 and 1988/89 reveal a similar pattern:
agricultural GDP fell by 13.8 per cent in the first year
and rose by 27 per cent in the second (World Bank
1990: 1O6).
For a general discussion of the importance of treating inter-annual variability in discussion of food security, see Wa,sers 1991.
Investment
(units)
Total demand
generated
(units) (multiplier)
(2+ 1)
of which
food
(units)
Food as %
demand
(4+2x100)
Food as
I
(4+1x100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FAO (1955) 100 161 1.6 48 30 48
Dandekar
(1965) (a) loo 232 2.3 67 29 67
(b) loo 276 2.8 56 20 56
Beringer
(1964) 100 204 2.0 65 32 65
Srivastava et al
(1975) (a) loo 128 1.3 58 45 58
(b) loo 168 1.7 44 26 44
(c) 100 195 1.9 36 18 36
Comparing good years and bad years reveals major
differences in the environment for counterpart funds.
In years of good rainfall, agricultural production is
high, as are producer incomes and agricultural labour
earnings. Food prices tend to fall, towards export parity
if trade is free and to a lower level if it is not; food stocks
tend to accumulate. Because food prices play such a
large part in the calculation of the cost of living index,
inflation tends to be low, although increased incomes
may generate excess demand for non-food commodities.
The tendency to low inflation is reinforced by the
downward pressure on the government deficit: this is
caused by the fact that revenues tend to be buoyant in
boom years while expenditures on social welfare
(including drought relief) are restricted. In bad years,
most of these tendencies are reversed. Food prices and
inflation generally rise, food stocks are run down,
incomes fall and the government deficit worsens, partly
because of expenditures on famine relief.
Consider now the differential impact of commodity
sales and counterpart fund expenditures in good and
bad years. In a good year, the deflationary effect of
commodity sales is probably not needed, at least as far
as food is concerned. If the food economy is booming
and the rest of the economy is not, there may be
inflationary or balance of payments pressure in non-
food sectors: in this case, non-food commodity aid may
be desirable. At the same time, the expenditure of
counterpart funds may also be unnecessary: employ-
ment and incomes are likely to be high and the
government deficit is likely to be low in relative terms,
if not in absolute ones.
In bad years, the situation is entirely different. Here,
real shortages are likely to develop in the food sector,
leading to rising prices and deteriorating real incomes
for the poor. Commodity sales could help greatly by
reducing inflationary pressure. At the same time, the
demands on the government budget will increase,
especially if a famine relief operation is required: a
contribution from counterpart funds would help to
avoid an escalating budget deficit. Putting these two
parts of the argument together, monetised food aid
could generate a counterpart fund to spend on
maintaining food entitlements.
These arguments suggest that commodity aid
deliveries and counterpart fund expenditures need to
be calibrated according to the state of the recipient
economy. In general, commodity aid will be of more
use in bad years than in good ones, and this will be more
true the more such aid is non-marginal.
If calibration is needed on a yearly basis, there are
important conclusions for the management of
programme aid, particularly as regards the desirability
of multi-annual programming. In the food aid field,
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'substitution actions', which replace food aid with cash,
have been introduced to help ensure continuity of
support in years when food aid is not needed. In import
programmes, there is usually a great deal of flexibility
built into the programme through the use of positive
and negative lists. However, there may be a need to
revise the lists to take account of changing domestic
conditions.
3.3 Fiscal and import dependence
One reason why continuity of support is needed is that
recipient governments may become dependent on the
budgetary contribution of counterpart funds. This is
not an issue much discussed in the current literature on
counterpart funds, but is a major topic in the food aid
literature. Nevertheless, as Maxwell and Singer
(198 1:227) noted, the allegation that aid acts as a 'fiscal
drug' is not unique to food aid and it is 'difficult to
judge whether food aid is particularly sharply exposed'.
In their review of the literature up to 1977, Maxwell
and Singer reported that fiscal dependence had been on
the agenda since 1960 and had been a major issue in
many large recipients, including India. In one extreme
case, Bangladesh, 40 per cent of the national budget in
the mid l970s was derived from food aid counterpart
funds.
Fiscal dependence has continued to be a concern in
food aid. A recent review of the literature regarding
sub-Saharan Africa provided evidence of actual or
potential fiscal dependence in Botswana, Lesotho, East
Africa and the Sahel (Thomas et al 1989:42). In one
East African case, Green suggested that 'the likely
restoration of food self-sufficiency in maize in 1985/86
could, in principle, have increased the recurrent budget
deficit for 1985/86 by up to $US 100 million, or 30 per
cent' (Green 1986:18). This presumably assumes that
food aid normally provided would no longer be
available: and that no substitution action would be
arranged.
Whether or not fiscal dependence is seen as a problem
partly depends on the observer's point of view. Some
have argued that programme aid which contributes to
recurrent budgets is a positive good (Sharpley 1986,
Jennings and Shaw 1987). It could be seen as an
international transfer payment. On the other hand,
some observers would be concerned at a possible
disincentive to tax collection; and many developing
countries would be concerned about possible
dependence on unreliable aid flows.
There are two possible ways out of the dilerBma, both
relevant to the management of counterpart funds. The
first is, so far as possible, to assure continuity of supply
of aid, whether directly resulting in counterpart funds
or not. This is especially true where counterpart funds
are used to fund recurrent expenditures. Perhaps the
balance between support for the development budget
and the recurrent budget should depend partly on the
reliability of future aid flows. Only aid which is secure
should be used to fund recurrent expenditures.
The second defence against fiscal dependence is to look
directly at the disincentives to revenue generation. If
large commodity aid shipments are associated with lax
revenue raising, then there is prima facie evidence of
fiscal dependency. If, on the other hand, appropriate
tax policies are in place and are being effectively
implemented, then fiscal dependency is of less concern.
However, the argument suggests that commodity aid
donors should pay special attention to this item.
A related issue has to do with import dependence. Here
also, the argument has largely been driven by the
literature on food aid, where the concern is with
increasing wheat imports, often associated with large
consumer subsidies.
The strongest conclusion that can be drawn from the
literature on this topic is that where subsidies are large
and where there is no commitment by the government
to eliminate generalized subsidies, wheat aid should be
withdrawn (e.g. Maxwell 1987). An alternative view is
that the granting of food aid should be conditional on a
review of food policy and on agreement to a staged
withdrawal of inappropriate food policies (e.g. World
Bank 1990 on Sudan).
The same argument applies by analogy to other forms
of commodity aid, including those ¿overed in general
terms by an import programme 'positive list'. The
implication for counterpart fund programming is that
there needs to be special attention to the pricing
arrangements for the particular commodities supplied
as aid or to be purchased within import programmes. It
may be, for example, that commodity pricing is
inappropriate, even though the IMF and the World
Bank have approved the thrust of government policy
taken as a whole. In this case, the IMF/World Bank
'green light' is not enough to justify commodity aid.
3.4 Absorptive capacity and disincentive effects
The fourth set of issues has to do with concerns about
absorptive capacity and disincentives effects and
revolves largely around the price of aid commodities.
The starting point is a debate about the absorptive
capacity for aid. In the World Bank/WFP report on
food aid to sub-Saharan Africa, absorptive capacity is
seen to coincide with a level of imports such that
'domestic prices are equal to the real border price (the
import price multiplied by the shadow exchange rate)'
(World Bank/WFP 1991:19).
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The report goes on to qualify this conclusion by
referring to the case for price stabilization in some
years; and to make the important point that what
happens to food prices depends on how aid is used. If
food aid makes possible additional projects and if these
increase the demand for food, then 'absorptive capacity
is limited only by the ability to design and implement
new projects and by the domestic or imported supply of
non-food commodities' (ibid:20).
In principle, the argument here applies to all
commodity aid, not just food aid: if the supply of a
commodity is too great, then there are likely to be
disincentives to local production. The argument has
less force in the case of financial transfers, where the
commodity composition of imports is determined by
demand.
The important point for counterpart fund managers is
that they need to estimate absorptive capacity for
commodity aid. This means that they need to assess the
effect of the combined commodity supply/counterpart
expenditure process on individual commodity prices
ex-ante and monitor these ex-post.
The disincentive debate has been a major feature of the
food aid debate for three decades. Schultz argued in
1960 that food aid sold onto a recipient market would
depress the prices of the same or competing
commodities and that this price effect would have a
disincentive effect on local producers. The disincentive
effect has been a major area of study since then and four
main conclusions relevant to counterpart funds have
been reached.
First, food aid cannot be held responsible for
disincentive effects if it merely substitutes for
commercial imports a country would anyway have
made. Only if food aid represents additional imports
can there be a risk of agricultural disincentives (Clay
and Singer 1985:16). This suggests that it is important
to differentiate between commodity aid imports that
are additional and those that are not.
Second, the disincentive effect is offset to the extent
that the real resource is used to expand demand. This
can be done directly, by distributing food to hungry
people; or indirectly, by increasing expenditure on
poverty alleviation programmes (Stewart 1986; Fitz-
patrick and Storey 1989). As seen above, the extra
demand for food can account for up to two thirds of the
initial value of food delivered. Of course, if food aid is
not additional, this increase in demand will tend to be
inflationary.
Third, it is important to undertake a careful analysis of
price movements. In the earlier literature, any fall in
prices was interpreted as a disincentive to local
production. In later analysis, however, it became clear
that a fall in price from the high 'scarcity' levels
prevalent at times of shortage could actually be a good
thing. This led Maxwell to conclude that 'disincentive
should be measured not in terms of lower prices, but in
terms of 'deviation from optimum prices" (Maxwell
199 1:69).
The implications for monitoring are that a guide price
needs to be established, with limits of acceptable
variation (ibid). If prices fall outside the range, then
remedial action will be necessary: a substitution action
or a change to the timing of food aid distribution or sale.
Finally, it is possible for disincentives to occur at the
regional level. This is especially likely to be the case
where large shipments of commodity aid are made for
free distribution or in order to facilitate public works
projects (Maxwell 1991:71). Here again, commodity
aid managers need to monitor possible negative effects.
4 TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
There are two keys principles involved in defining new
guidelines for counterpart fund management. The first
is that the guidelines should be practical. It is already
the case that donor policy runs some way ahead of
implementation. Substantial improvements to the
management of counterpart funds would be possible if
donors were only able to do in practice what they
already say they would like to do in theory. In this
context, there is little point in adding layers of
theoretical complexity that would be unlikely to be
implemented.
The other principle is that effort by donors to improve
management should be proportional to the benefits. In
particular, this means that some system of thresholds is
desirable, so that analysis intensifies as the size of
counterpart funds rises relative to the recipient
economy. A good comparative example is to be found
in the US legislation on food aid. Here, the guidelines
governing the Bellmon amendment, which deals with
the disincentive effect of food aid, specify that a full
disincentive analysis is necessary only if US food aid
accounts for 10 per cent of total staple consumption; a
less detailed analysis is required if US food accounts for
2-10 per cent of total consumption; and no analysis at
all is required if the figure is below 2 per cent (USAID
1985). There is no real analytical basis for these figures
and the effects may be disproportionate at the regional
level (Maxwell 1991). Nevertheless, something similar
may be appropriate in the case of counterpart funds.
Turning to substance, there are three themes to pursue.
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The first is the most important: it is to try and shift the
discussion somewhat away from the pure macro-
economics of counterpart funds back towards a
stronger focus on development activities. In this
connection, the key questions to ask are what additional
activities or policies will the provision of commodity
aid make possible, that would otherwise either have to
be cut or not be undertaken at all; and what effect will
these activities have on the demand for different
commodities, on resource use within the economy and
on such economic and financial variables as the budget
deficit, the rate of inflation, the Balance of Payments
account, the growth rate and income distribution.
A second theme is the importance of taking account of
year to year variability in the demand for and the
possible effects of both commodity aid and expenditures
of counterpart funds. Both strict commodity aid and
import programmes tied to particular commodities are
best planned in a rolling, multi-year framework with
annual reviews and provision for substitution actions.
A third and final theme is the need to look beyond the
confines of the Public Expenditure Programme to
wider issues of policy. This applies both to the planning
stage of commodity aid/counterpart fund proposals
and to monitoring. If policies are not 'right' then the
commodity aid/counterpart fund package will not
achieve its objectives; indeed, it may, as in the case of
food aid disincentives, actually make things worse.
Finally, there are three research issues which are not
less important but which are less operational than those
listed above:
i The desirability of modelling work to elucidate the
questions of commodity disaggregation and production/
consumption linkages discussed in Section 3.1. It
would be extremely useful for this to be done using a
social accounting matrix, so as to explore income
distribution questions in more detail.
ii The need for a better understanding of thresholds,
for different kinds of aid at different levels of analysis.
It is especially important to have a better basis for
thresholds than the rule of thumb derived from the
USAID Belimon amendment guidelines; and to
develop rules not just for the national level but also for
the regional level.
iii The need for a stronger developing country
perspective on the issues, perhaps through locally
managed country case studies. These country cases
could be particularly helpful if they explored the grey
area of competing conditionalities between different
donors.
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